A New Era of Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations
“We cannot forget the past completely, but we have to put the past behind us and look forward to what we can do together.” With these words, Ikram Sehgal, Chairman of the Pathfinder Group and a respected voice in Pakistan’s strategic community, offers a timely reflection on the shifting dynamics between Pakistan and Bangladesh. His remarks come at a moment of political transition, regional uncertainty, and renewed potential for cooperation between the two nations.
Sehgal begins by reflecting on the events of 1971, describing the civil war that ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh as a tragedy that should never have happened. He explains that the conflict arose when the Awami League, having secured a majority in Pakistan’s national elections, was denied power. While he refrains from delving into the political and legal debates, he asserts that a peaceful resolution was possible, had the situation been handled differently. Sehgal notes that although varying figures are often cited about the death toll, what remains undisputed is that the scale of bloodshed that year left deep scars.
Following independence, Bangladesh entered a prolonged period of instability. In 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman — who had led the country through its formative years — was assassinated in a military coup. What followed was a wave of coups and countercoups, until General Ziaur Rahman rose to power, not by leading the coup himself, but through a military-led transition. He became Chief Martial Law Administrator and later won elections that Sehgal describes as free and fair. Ziaur Rehman assumed the presidency until his own assassination a few years later after which General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, thenArmy Chief, took control. According to Sehgal, the process of re-engagement with Pakistan quietly began under Ziaur Rahman and accelerated during Ershad’s rule.
That initial period of mutual cooperation had survived through the 1990s and early 2000s — even amid the fierce rivalry between (former) Prime Ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajid. Hasina's return to power in 2009 marked the beginning of a new political phase — one that saw significant infrastructure development and economic progress. Yet, it was also defined by increasing authoritarianism and rising Indian influence across Bangladesh’s civil and military structures. Sehgal notes that India had embedded itself in nearly every corridor of power, influencing state appointments and promotions.
Public frustration intensified as the Awami League’s grip on power tightened. Reports of disappearances, political repression, and a growing reliance on India cast a shadow over Hasina’s administration. Sehgal emphasizes that while senior military officers were screened to ensure they were not anti-India, ordinary soldiers and junior officers — drawn from the native Bengali stock — retained deep national and religious convictions. He remarks that Bangladeshis, in many respects, are more religiously observant than Pakistanis, and notably free of the sectarian divides that continue to fragment Pakistani society.
By 2021, on the 50th anniversary of Bangladesh’s independence, India escalated its anti-Pakistan campaign in Bangladesh, but the strategy backfired. Sehgal explains that anti-India sentiment surged among the Bangladeshi population, especially as it became apparent how heavily Indian approval factored into domestic governance. Discontent grew until it reached a breaking point: mass protests overwhelmed law enforcement, which could no longer contain the situation.
When the military was called in, many officers — particularly those below the rank of major — refused to fire on civilians. The army chief, General Waker Uz Zaman, who had only recently assumed command, realized that the people would not accept violence oppression, so he advised Hasina to leave the country to preserve stability. After a lot of resistance, and with encouragement from her own ministers, she eventually complied.
Following her departure, the student-led movement that had led to her ousting pushed for an interim government led by a neutral figure. That figure emerged in Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank. Revered as “the banker to the poor,” Yunus has pledged to hold free and fair elections within a year. His appointment has been met with cautious optimism across the political spectrum and civil society.
This dramatic transition, Sehgal argues, represents a complete failure of India’s long-standing strategic calculations in Bangladesh. Despite influencing high-ranking officials, India failed to win over the broader military or the people themselves, whose loyalty remained deeply nationalistic and resistant to foreign alignment.
With the Hasina era now concluded and new leadership emerging, Sehgal sees an opportunity to redefine Pakistan–Bangladesh relations on the basis of mutual respect, shared history, and forward-looking policies. Drawing from Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s idea of “two countries, one nation,” he advocates for visa-free travel, tariff-free trade, and enhanced regional connectivity — not as a step toward reunification, but toward meaningful partnership.
He stresses that while we should move forward “without animosity toward India,” this future does not need to depend on India’s cooperation. Pakistan must stop being India-centric. Sehgal argues that Pakistan has a tremendous place in the world today, but to realize that potential, it must embrace visionary leadership and political compromise.
With Hasina's era over and India’s influence shaken, is this the moment for Pakistan and Bangladesh to reclaim a regional vision that stands on its own? Let us know in the comments.
This article was developed with the assistance of AI tools.
